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### DDoS Attacks Classification using Numeric Attribute-based Gaussian Naive Bayes

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Abstract—Cyber attacks by sending large data packets that deplete computer network service resources by using multiple computers when attacking are called Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Total Data Packet and important information in the form of log files sent by the attacker can be observed and captured through the port mirroring of the computer network service. The classification system is required to distinguish network traffic into two conditions, first normal condition, and second attack condition. The Gaussian Naive Bayes classification is one of the methods that can be used to process numeric attribute as input and determine two decisions of access that occur on the computer network service that is "normal" access or access under "attack" by DDoS as output. This research was conducted in Ahmad Dahlan University Networking Laboratory (ADUNL) for 60 minutes with the result of classification of 8 IP Address with normal access and 6 IP Address with DDoS attack access.

Keywords—Distributed Denial of Service (DdoS); Gaussian Naive Bayes; Numeric

#### INTRODUCTION

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks still top the of Cyber Attacks. In Open Source Intelligence by month January reported an unusually low number of Attack Techniques shows 34% of the cases, the reason was not specified. Where as DDoS leads the chart of the known techniques with 22,3%, ahead Hijacks (13,8%), and Defacements (10%). Targeted attacks are immediately behind with a remarkable 7,4%. Fig. 1 shows attacks technique until January 2016. Data shows that DDoS attacks are still always very interesting to be the object of the research.<sup>1</sup>

DDoS attacks through compute networks, especially Local Area Network (LAN) are detected using a multiclassification technique, that is, by combining data mining method to get better accuracy. In pre-processing data, before loading data sets into data mining software, relevant attributes are selected to get accurate and unused classification omitted because it will add noise that affect accuracy [1]. Sukma Aji Department of Information Technology Ahmad Dahlan University Yogyakarta Indonesia





Fig. 1. Top 9 of Attack Techniques January 2016.

In research [2] the Comparative Analysis of Different DDoS Detection Techniques used Statistical Method, Intrusion Detection System (IDS), IDS based Dempster-Shafer Theory, Host Based IDS, Network IDS, and Real Time IDS of Throughput, Fault Tolerance, Performance, Overheads, Response Time, and Detection Rate.

Gülay Öke [3] used Multiple Bayesian Classifier and Random Neural Network to detect Denial of Service attacks. Naive Bayes Classifier makes a decision by collecting offline input features. The input feature is bit rate, an increase in bit rate, entropy value of the incoming bit rate, Hurst parameter, delay, and D12 yrate. Bharti Nagpal [4] comparing 5 DDOS attack tools Trinity, Low Orbit Ion Cann 10 (LOIC), Tribal Flood Network, Mstream, and Trinoo as Architecture used, Type of Flooding used for attacking, Type of DDOS method used, Possible damage caused, Channel encryption. Gnanapriya [5] research S 9 ware-Defined Networking (SDN) shows that SDN provides a new opportunity to defeat DDOS attacks in cloud computing environments, and summarizes the excellent SDN features to 9 efeat DDOS attacks. Then review the study of the launch of DDOS attacks on SDN and methods against DDoS attacks on the SDN.

1 http://www.hackmageddon.com



Norm<sup>3</sup> TCP connections usually start transmitting from the user by sending SYN to the router, and the router will allocate the buffer to the user and respond with SYN and ACK packets. This stage, the connection is in a half open state, waiting for an ACK response from the user to complete the connection settings. When the connection is completed, this is called 3-way linkage and TCP SYN Flood attacks manipulate this 3-way linkage by maki 17 the router busy with SYN request [6]. TCP SYN Flood is a 3 mmon form of Denial of Service attack. Fig. 2 shows the TCP SYN Flood happened. TCP SYN Flood can be observed with a Packet Capture application by using a port mirroring to observe a copy of router activity. TCP SYN flood features are often the emergence of one of the IP Address to the router. The source IP Address that always appears to the router is calculated within a specified time range and used as feature extraction as a DDAS attack [7].

Based on earlier research regarding packet classification with Naive Bayes, in this paper, we provide a detailed understanding of how to process numerical attributes on a network traffic activity based on the Gaussian Naive Bayes method.

#### II. BASIC THEORY

A. Gaussian Method

The Gaussian method is one of the common and important methods in probability and 4 atistics, introduced by Gauss in his study of error theory. Gauss uses it to describe errors. Experience shows that many random variables, the height of adult males, and reaction time in psychological experiments, all of which can be solved by the Gaussian Method [8], [9]. The Gaussian method is:

$$P(x) = \frac{1}{\delta\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{\frac{(x-\mu)^2}{2\delta^2}}$$
(1)

Where,  $\mu$  is average and  $\delta$  is standard deviation, to calculate  $\mu$  and  $\delta$  values for numerical attributes using formula

$$\mu = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i}{n} \tag{2}$$

$$\delta^2 = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \mu)^2}{n - 1} \tag{3}$$

#### B. Naive Bayes Method

Bayes method is used to calculate the probability of occurrence of an event based on the observed effects of observation. Naive Bayes method is simple probabilistic-based prediction technique based on Bayes's method application with strong independence assumptions [10]. Naive Bayes method is:

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(B|A)P(A)}{P(B)}$$
(4)

Where,

P(AlB) is the posterior of class (target) given predictor (attribute).

P(B|A) is the likelihood which is the probability of predictor given class.

#### P(A) is the prior probability of class.

P(B) is the prior probability of predictor.

#### C. Accuracy

The accuracy of a classification system is described as the data output level compared to the desired value. Accuracy in classification is calculated from:

- Normal access data in a normal class (True Positives (TP)).
- Normal access data outside the normal class (False Positives (FP)).
- Attacks access data outside the attack class (False Negatives (FN)).
- Attack access data in the attack class (True Negatives (TN)) [9].

$$Accuracy = \frac{TP + TN}{TP + FP + FN + TN}$$
(5)

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A. Topology




Fig. 3. Research laboratory of master informatics engineering topology.

Computer Network of ADUNL topology shown in Fig. 3 is distributed, the development of star topology. Router with IP Address 172.10.64.250 and 192.168.10.254 become the network service center and access divider of each user within the scope of ADUNL.

#### B. Attacks Scenario

IP address 192.168.10.64.2; 192.168.10.64.3; 192.168.10.64.4; 192.168.10.64.5; 192.168.10.64.6; 192.168.10.64.7; 192.168.10.64.8; and 192.168.10.64.9 (user) perform normal activities by accessing the site www.detik.com and www.youtube.com and run the function in the site by pressing play movie button.

The attack is done from outside ADUNL to victim router with IP address 172.10.64.250 by an attacker with IP address 172.10.64.199; 172.10.85.151; 172.10.71.29; 172.10.71.49; 172.10.201.5; and 172.10.201.19 using DDoS attack tool Low Orbit Ion Canon (LOIC).

Investigator use port mirroring access with IP address 192.168.30.1. To retrieve log data of network traffic from within and to ADUNL.

#### C. Methodology




Fig. 4. Methodology of DDoS attacks classification.

DDoS attacks classification step of the methodology is shown in Fig. 4.

- Captured IP packet is used to retrieve data in the form of log file network traffic with port mirroring access in *pcap* format.
- Analyzing IP and data packet, in this step is to analyze the IP address who is doing the attack and how long the packet is sent.
- Extraction, in this stage log files with the .pcap format, is converted into spreadsheet files so they can be processed using Gaussian Naive Bayes method.
- Pre-processing, at this step the making of input parameters can be used in the classification method.

- Apply Gaussian Naive Bayes, at this stage Gaussian Naive Bayes classification method, is used to process data that already has input parameters.
- Prediction, at this step Gaussian Naive Bayes method, determines the data that has been processed into two decisions that are normal access or under attack.

#### IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS

Object research result capture network traffic at ADUNL. The methodological step is carried out coherently to produce maximum research.

#### A. Captured IP Packet Result

Log file of captured network traffic for 60 minutes divide within 3 minutes each time access through port mirroring ADUNL by the investigator using Wireshark packet capture in .pcap format. Fig. 5 shows capture result in .pcap format.

| 词 Libraries                 | Jurnal Ilmiahku ke ILKO | 12/14/2016 9:04 AM | Microsoft Office Word Docu    | 1,236 Ki |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------|
| Documents                   | LOIC-1.0.8-binary       | 12/16/2016 2:34 PM | WinRAR ZIP archive            | 101 Ki   |
| Music                       | mashim                  | 4/4/2017 8:02 AM   | JPEG image                    | 54 Ki    |
| Pictures                    | in naive-bayes          | 4/15/2017 12:07 PM | Microsoft Office Excel 97-200 | 16 Ki    |
| Videos                      | 📇 normal Sm3nit         | 4/25/2017 1:24 PM  | Wireshark capture file        | 12 Ki    |
|                             | normal 5m3nit           | 4/21/2017 6:08 PM  | Microsoft Office Excel Works  | 21,557 K |
| Nomegroup                   | 🗐 pengembangan sistem   | 12/7/2016 2:55 PM  | Microsoft Office Word Docu    | 743 K    |
|                             | Pernyataan_Keaslian_Jur | 12/14/2016 10:07   | Microsoft Office Word 97 - 20 | 30 K     |
| Computer<br>Local Disk (C:) | Petunjuk_Pembayaran_P   | 12/7/2016 3:52 PM  | Firefox HTML Document         | 413 K    |
|                             | 🗐 serangan 5m3nit       | 4/22/2017 6:32 PM  | Microsoft Office Excel Works  | 29,561 K |
| Local Disk (D:)             | SERANGAN                | 4/10/2017 9:56 AM  | DAT File                      | 1 K      |
| Local Disk (E:)             | statistik naive bayes1  | 4/22/2017 6:24 PM  | Microsoft Office Excel Works  | 106 K    |
| Network                     | Template_Jurnal_Ilmiah  | 12/7/2016 3:53 PM  | Microsoft Office Word Docu    | 33 K     |

Fig. 5. Capture result in .pcap format.

#### B. Analyzing IP and data packet

IP address that accesses ADUNL and estimates how many packets of data transmitted by and from the IP address that is doing the activity calculated based on log files that have been obtained. Fig. 6 shows the IP address accessing ADUNL.

| File | Edit              | View Go         | Capture  | Analyze | Statistics Telephony | Wireless Tools Help |          |        |         |
|------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|---------|----------------------|---------------------|----------|--------|---------|
|      | <b>I</b> <i>L</i> | 0 0             | XC       | 9       | ST 1 = =             | Q Q Q II            |          |        |         |
| A    | pply a d          | isplay filter < | cCtrl-/> |         |                      |                     |          |        |         |
| No.  |                   | Time            |          |         | Source               | Destination         | Protocol | Length | Info    |
| 2    | 2353              | 2017-02-13      | 14:37:08 | .956900 | 192.168.10.8         | 101.203.171.78      | QUIC     | 128    | Payload |
| 2    | 2353              | 2017-02-13      | 14:37:08 | .957171 | 101.203.171.78       | 192.168.10.8        | QUIC     | 1439   | Payloa  |
| 2    | 2353              | 2017-02-13      | 14:37:08 | .957175 | 192.168.10.8         | 101.203.171.78      | QUIC     | 128    | Payloa  |
| 2    | 2353              | 2017-02-13      | 14:37:08 | .957177 | 101.203.171.78       | 192.168.10.8        | QUIC     | 1439   | Payloa  |
|      | 3330              | 2017-02-13      | 15:25:08 | .981862 | 172.10.64.250        | 172.10.64.199       | TCP      | 101    | 80+621  |
|      | 3331              | 2017-02-13      | 15:25:08 | .982126 | 172.10.64.199        | 172.10.64.250       | TCP      | 149    | [TCP se |
| 1    | 3332              | 2017-02-13      | 15:25:08 | .982127 | 172.10.64.250        | 172.10.64.199       | TCP      | 101    | 80+6214 |
| _    | 3333              | 2017-02-13      | 15:25:08 | .982127 | 172.10.201.5         | 172.10.64.250       | TCP      | 133    | [TCP s  |

Fig. 6. IP address accessing in ADUNL.

#### C. Extraction

Capture results of network traffic log files in .pcap format can not be processed into columns and rows required in the classification process. To be processed into columns and rows of .pcap format are extracted into the .csv format and then extracted into xlsx format. Fig. 7 shows extracting .pcap format into .csv format.

#### D. Pre-processing

At this stage, it is processing the results of network traffic extraction into the main parameters that can identify normal access or attack. The main parameters used as input parameters shown in Table 1. In this research, two input parameters taken are:

- Incoming of IP address (IIP) within specified time range (2nd column is x attribute).
- Packet length (PL) within a specified time range (3rd column is y attribute).

| Open<br>Open Recent       | Ctrl+O       |                | 0,0,0,1                      |  |  |
|---------------------------|--------------|----------------|------------------------------|--|--|
| Merge                     |              | Source         | Destination                  |  |  |
| Import from Hex Dump      |              | 192.168.30.254 | 192.168.30.1                 |  |  |
| Close                     | Ctrl+W       | 209.85.229.235 | 192.168.10.1                 |  |  |
| ciuse                     | Current      | 192.168.30.254 | 192.168.30.1                 |  |  |
| Save                      | Ctrl+S       | 209.85.229.235 | 192.168.10.1<br>192.168.30.1 |  |  |
| Save As                   | Ctrl+Shift+S | 192.168.30.254 |                              |  |  |
| Save AS                   | Cur+Shint+S  | 209.85.229.235 | 192.168.10.1                 |  |  |
| File Set                  | ,            | 192.168.10.1   | 209.85.229.23                |  |  |
|                           |              | 192.168.10.1   | 209.85.229.23                |  |  |
| Export Specified Packets  |              | 192.168.30.254 | 192.168.30.1                 |  |  |
| Export Packet Dissections | •            | As Plain Text  | 192.168.10.1                 |  |  |
| Export Packet Bytes       | Ctrl+H       | As CSV         | 192.168.30.1<br>192.168.10.1 |  |  |
| Export PDUs to File       |              | As "C" Arrays  | 192.168.30.1                 |  |  |
| Export SSL Session Keys   |              |                | 192.168.10.1                 |  |  |
|                           |              | As PSML XML    | 209.85.229.23                |  |  |
| Export Objects            |              | As PDML XML    | 209.85.229.23                |  |  |
| Print                     | Ctrl+P       | As JSON        | 209.85.229.23                |  |  |

Fig. 7. Extracting .pcap format into .csv format.

TABLE I. INPUT PARAMETERS IN TIME RANGE 0-3 MINUTES

| IP address    | Incoming IP<br>(IIP) in time<br>range (x<br>attribute) | Packet length<br>(PL) in time<br>range (y<br>attribute) | Access | Time<br>range<br>(minutes) |
|---------------|--|---|--------|----------------------------|
| 192.168.10.2  | 81   | 16134   | Normal | 0-3                        |
| 192.168.10.3  | 2939   | 405244  | Normal | 0-3                        |
| 192.168.10.4  | 803  | 118889  | Normal | 0-3                        |
| 192.168.10.5  | 1173   | 165510  | Normal | 0-3                        |
| 192.168.10.6  | 1074   | 154472  | Normal | 0-3                        |
| 192.168.10.7  | 1566   | 207772  | Normal | 0-3                        |
| 192.168.10.8  | 1105   | 155560  | Normal | 0-3                        |
| 192.168.10.9  | 1963   | 268497  | Normal | 0-3                        |
| 172.10.64.199 | 3386   | 1088676   | Attack | 0-3                        |
| 172.10.85.151 | 14323  | 2432059   | Attack | 0-3                        |
| 172.10.201.5  | 10787  | 2282970   | Attack | 0-3                        |
| 172.10.201.19 | 7658   | 1831513   | Attack | 0-3                        |
| 172.10.71.29  | 8899   | 2525711   | Attack | 0-3                        |
| 172.10.71.49  | 9437   | 1433478   | Attack | 0-3                        |

#### E. Apply Gaussian Naive Bayes method

Average ( $\mu$ ) and Standard deviation ( $\delta$ ) are calculated for every normal access and attack on x and y attributes used (2) and (3).

- Average of incoming IP  $(\mu)$  normal = 1338
- Standard deviation of incoming IP ( $\delta$ ) normal = 847

- Average of packet length  $(\mu)$  normal = 186510
- Standard deviation of packet length (δ)normal = 114045
- Average of incoming IP (µ) attack = 9082
- Standard deviation of incoming ( $\delta$ ) attack = 3606
- Average of packet length ( $\mu$ ) attack = 1932401
- Standard deviation of packet length ( $\delta$ ) attack = 582331

Formula (1) is used to calculate the likelihood of Incoming IP address (IIP) normal and attack.

$$P(IIP|normal) = \frac{1}{\delta(normal)\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{\frac{(x-\mu(normal))^2}{2\delta(normal)^2}}$$

- $P(192.168.10.2 = 81 | normal) = \frac{1}{847\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{\frac{(81-1338)^2}{2.847^2}} = 0.0001566$
- P(192.168.10.3 = 2939|normal) = 7,892E 05
- P(192.168.10.4 = 803 | normal) = 0,0003858
- P(192.168.10.5 = 1173 | normal) = 0,0004622
- P(192.168.10.6 = 1074 | normal) = 0,0004487
- P(192.168.10.7 = 1566 | normal) = 0,0004542
- P(192.168.10.8 = 1105 | normal) = 0,0004535
- P(192.168.10.9 = 1963|normal) = 0,0003587
- P(172.10.64.199 = 3386 | normal) = 2,532E 05
- P(172.10.85.151 = 14323 | normal) = 4,342E 55
- P(172.10.201.5 = 10787 | normal) = 4,451E 31
- P(172.10.201.19 = 7658 | normal) = 3,83E = 16
- P(172.10.71.29 = 8899|normal) = 2,339E 21
- P(172.10.71.49 = 9437 | normal) = 6,591E 24

$$P(IIP|attack) = \frac{1}{\delta(attack)\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{\frac{(x-\mu(attack))^2}{2\delta(attack)^2}}$$

- $P(192.168.10.2 = 81 | attack) = \frac{1}{3306\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{\frac{(81-9082)^2}{2.3306^2}} = 4,908E 06$
- P(192.168.10.3 = 2939|attack) = 2,592E 05
- P(192.168.10.4 = 803 | attack) = 7,93E 06
- P(192.168.10.5 = 1173 | attack) = 9,984E 06
- P(192.168.10.6 = 1074 | attack) = 9,397E 06
- P(192.168.10.7 = 1566 | attack) = 1,261E 05
- P(192.168.10.8 = 1105 | attack) = 9,578E 06
- P(192.168.10.9 = 1963 | attack) = 1,576E 05
- P(172.10.64.199 = 3386 | attack) = 3,178E 05
- P(172.10.85.151 = 14323 | attack) = 3,848E 05

- P(172.10.201.5 = 10787 | attack) = 9,893E 05
- P(172.10.201.19 = 7658|attack) = 0,0001023
- P(172.10.71.29 = 8899|attack) = 0,0001105
- P(172.10.71.49 = 9437 | attack) = 0,0001101

Formula (1) also used to calculate the likehood of Packet Length (PL) normal and attack.

$$P(PL|normal) = \frac{1}{\delta(normal)\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{\frac{(y-\mu(normal))^2}{2\delta(normal)^2}}$$

- P(192.168.10.2 = 16134 | normal) = $\frac{1}{114045\sqrt{2\pi}}e^{\frac{(16134 - 186510)^2}{2.114045^2}} = 1,146E - 06$
- P(192.168.10.3 = 405244 | normal) = 5,56E 07
- P(192.168.10.4 = 118889 | normal) = 2,934E 06
- P(192.168.10.5 = 165510 | normal) = 3,439E 06
- P(192.168.10.6 = 154472 | normal) = 3,363E 06
- P(192.168.10.7 = 207772 | normal) = 3,438E 06
- P(192.168.10.8 = 155560 | normal) = 3,372E 06
- P(192.168.10.9 = 268497 | normal) = 2,702E 06
- P(172.10.64.199 = 1088676|normal) = 9,021E 20
- P(172.10.85.151 = 2432059|normal) = 2,272E 90
- P(172.10.201.5 = 2282970 | normal) = 1,46E − 79
- P(172.10.201.19 = 1831513|normal) = 2,317E 51
- P(172.10.71.29 = 2525711|normal) = 1,541E 97
- P(172.10.71.49 = 1433478 | normal) = 3,832E 32

$$P(PL|attack) = \frac{1}{\delta(attack)\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{\frac{(y-\mu(attack))^2}{2\delta(attack)^2}}$$

- P(192.168.10.2 = 16134 | attack) = $\frac{1}{582331\sqrt{2\pi}}e^{\frac{(16134-1932401)^2}{2.582331^2}} = 3,050E - 09$
- P(192.168.10.3 = 405244 | attack) = 2,2E 08
- P(192.168.10.4 = 118889 | attack) = 5,367E 09
- P(192.168.10.5 = 165510 | attack) = 6,865E 09
- P(192.168.10.6 = 154472 | attack) = 6,48E 09
- P(192.168.10.7 = 207772 | attack) = 8,534E 09
- P(192.168.10.8 = 155560 | attack) = 6,517E 09
- P(192.168.10.9 = 268497 | attack) = 1,156E 08

- P(172.10.64.199 = 1088676 | attack) = 2,398E 07
- P(172.10.85.151 = 2432059|attack) = 4,741E 07
- P(172.10.201.5 = 2282970 | attack) = 5,715E 07
- P(172.10.201.19 = 1831513|attack) = 6,749E 07
- P(172.10.71.29 = 2525711 | attack) = 4,077E 07
- P(172.10.71.49 = 1433478 | attack) = 4,746E 07

Probabilities for the nominal attributes are then calculated based on Table 1.

$$P(normal) = \frac{8}{14} = 0,5714$$
$$P(attack) = \frac{6}{14} = 0,4286$$

 $P(IP \ address \ 192.168.10.2) = \frac{1}{14} = 0,0714$ 

Formula (4) is used to calculate  $P(normal \| IP)$  and  $P(attack \| IP)$ 

$$P(normal|IP) = \frac{P(IIP|normal)P(PL|normal)P(normal)}{P(IP)}$$

$$P(attack|IP) = \frac{P(IIP|attack)P(PL|attack)P(attack)}{P(IP)}$$

- $P(normal|192.168.10.2) = \frac{0,0001566 \times 1,146E 06 \times 0,5714}{0,0714} = 1,436E 09$
- $P(attack|192.168.10.2) = \frac{4,908E-06 \times 3,050E-09 \times 0,4286}{0.0714} = 8,983E 14$
- P(normall192.168.10.3) = 3,51E-10
   P(attack192.168.10.3) = 3,421E-12
- P(normall192.168.10.4) = 9,057E-09
   P(attackl192.168.10.4) = 2,554E-13
- P(normall192.168.10.5) = 1,272E-08
   P(attack1192.168.10.5) = 4,112E-13
- P(normall192.168.10.6) = 1,207E-08
   P(attack1192.168.10.6) = 3,654E-13
- P(normall192.168.10.7) = 1,249E-08
   P(attackl192.168.10.7) = 6,454E-13
- P(normall192.168.10.8) = 1,223E-08
   P(attackl192.168.10.8) = 3,745E13
- P(normall192.168.10.9) = 7,753E-09
   P(attackl192.168.10.9) = 1,093E-12
- P(normal|172.10.64.199) = 1,827E-23

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P(attackl172.10.64.199) = 4,572E-11

- P(normall172.10.85.151) = 7,892E-144
   P(attackl172.10.85.151) = 1,094E-10
- P(normall172.10.201.5) = 5,198E-109
   P(attackl172.10.201.5) = 3,393E-10
- P(normall172.10.201.19) = 7,099E-66
   P(attackl172.10.201.19) = 4,144E-10
- P(normall172.10.71.29) =2,884E-117
   P(attackl172.10.71.29) = 2,703E-10
- P(normall172.10.71.49) = 2,02E-54
   P(attackl172.10.71.49) = 3,135E-10
- F. Prediction

Decisions are predicted by comparison P(normalIIP) and P(attackIIP). If P(normalIIP) > P(attackIIP) then the decision is normal, and if P(normalIIP) < P(attackIIP) then the decision is under attack.

- P(normall192.168.10.2) > P(attack1192.168.10.2), then IP address 192.168.10.2 categorized in a normal class.
- P(normall192.168.10.3) > P(attack1192.168.10.3), then IP address 192.168.10.3 categorized in a normal class.
- P(normall192.168.10.4) > P(attack1192.168.10.4), then IP address 192.168.10.4 categorized in a normal class.
- P(normall192.168.10.5) > P(attack1192.168.10.5), then IP address 192.168.10.5 categorized in a normal class.
- P(normall192.168.10.6) > P(attack1192.168.10.6), then IP address 192.168.10.6 categorized in a normal class.
- P(normall192.168.10.7) > P(attack1192.168.10.7), then IP address 192.168.10.7 categorized in a normal class.
- P(normall192.168.10.8) > P(attackl192.168.10.8), then IP address 192.168.10.8 categorized in a normal class.
- P(normall192.168.10.9) > P(attack1192.168.10.9), then IP address 192.168.10.9 categorized in a normal class.
- P(normall172.10.64.199) < P(attack172.10.64.199), then IP address 172.10.64.199 categorized in attack class.
- P(normall172.10.85.151) < P(attackl172.10.85.151), then IP address 172.10.85.151 categorized in attack class.
- P(normall172.10.201.5) < P(attackl172.10.201.5), then IP address 172.10.201.5 categorized in attack class.
- P(normall172.10.201.19) < P(attack172.10.201.19), then IP address 172.10.201.19 categorized in attack class.
- P(normall172.10.71.29) < P(attack1172.10.71.29), then IP address 172.10.71.29 categorized in attack class.

- P(normall172.10.71.49) < P(attack172.10.71.49), then IP address 172.10.71.49 categorized in attack class.
- G. Visualization of Classification

Two-dimensional images can be used to display the classification results, so it can detect the level of accuracy. Matlab is the right tool to display the result of the classification.

| File | e Ec |     |      |      | e ol<br>ng l |     | Tool | s D   | ebug  | Desk  |       | Windo | w    | Help |
|------|------|-----|------|------|--------------|-----|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|
| e    | ) 6  |     | 10   | ma   | 1)2          | -)  | 6    | -     | •     |       | ation |       |      | -    |
| +    |      | -   | 1.0  | T    | +            | ÷   | 1.1  | 7     | 1 %   | Incor | ning  | IP    |      |      |
| 1    | -    | t   | - 0  | : 1  | /10          | 000 | :2*  | 4     |       | (norn | nal)  |       |      |      |
| 2    | -    | x1  | =    | 133  | 8 +          | 25  | 41 c | os (t | );8   | 1xSD  | =847  | , 1,5 | SxSI | )=12 |
| 3    | -    | y1  | =    | 186  | 510          | +   | 3421 | 35*s  | in (t | :);8  | 1xSD  | =1140 | )45, | 1,5  |
| 4    | -    | x2  | =    | 908  | 2 +          | 90  | 15*c | os (t | );8   | 1xSD  | =360  | 6,1,5 | XSI  | =54  |
| 5    | -    | y2  | =    | 193  | 240          | 1 + | 145  | 5827  | .5*:  | sin(t | );8   | 1xSD= | =582 | 2331 |
| 6    | -    | h2  | =    | plo  | t(x          | 1,y | 1,'g | ', x2 | , y2, | 'r')  | ;     |       |      |      |
| 7    | -    | set | t (h | 2, 1 | Lin          | eWi | dth' | ,2)   |       |       |       |       |      |      |

Fig. 8. Create set with average (μ) + Standard Deviation (δ) in Matlab.

Fig. 8 shows how to create a set based on average  $(\mu)$  + standard deviation ( $\delta$ ) in Matlab; x1, y1 is the set of normal access (green), whereas x2, y2 is the set of attack (red).




Fig. 9. Network traffic classification with class area  $\mu$ + $\delta$ .

Fig. 9 shows a visualization of ADUNL network traffic classification in 3 minutes time range with an area of class  $\mu+\delta$  using Matlab. The normal class area and the attack with  $\mu+\delta$  based on Fig. 9 have not precisely shaded the members of the set. The accuracy obtained using the formula (5) is 57,14%, then searched again the value of  $\delta$  to get the broad class that can shelter its members.




Fig. 10. Network traffic classification with class area  $\mu$ +(1,5 $\delta$ )

The normal class area and the attack with  $\mu$ +(1,5 $\delta$ ) based on Fig. 10 still have not precisely shaded the members of the set. The accuracy obtained using the formula (5) is 71,43%, then searched again the value of  $\delta$  to get the broad class that can shelter its members.




Fig. 11. Network traffic classification with class area  $\mu+(2\delta).$ 

The normal class area and the attack with  $\mu$ +(2 $\delta$ ) based on Fig. 11 still have not precisely shaded the members of the set. The accuracy obtained using the formula (5) is 78,57%, then

searched again the value of  $\boldsymbol{\delta}$  to get the broad class that can shelter its members.




Fig. 12. Network traffic classification with class area  $\mu$ +(2,5 $\delta$ ).

The normal class area with  $\mu$ +(2,5 $\delta$ ) based on Fig. 12 has not precisely overshadowed the set members, while the attack class is right to cover the set members. The accuracy obtained using the formula (5) is 92,86%, then searched again the value of  $\delta$  from the normal class to obtain the extent of class that can shelter its members.




Fig. 13. Network traffic classification with class normal area  $\mu$ +(3 $\delta$ ) and class attack area  $\mu$ +(2,5 $\delta$ ).

| No | IP Address    | Incoming IP (IIP)<br>in time range<br>(x attribute) | Packet length (PL)<br>in time range<br>(y attribute) | Access | P(normal/IP) | × | P(attackIIP) | CLASS  |
|----|---------------|---|--|--------|--------------|---|--------------|--------|
| 1  | 192.168.10.2  | 81  | 16134  | NORMAL | 1.145E-09    | > | 1.859E-11    | NORMAL |
| 2  | 192.168.10.3  | 2939  | 405244   | NORMAL | 9.789E-10    | > | 3.328E-11    | NORMAL |
| 3  | 192.168.10.4  | 803   | 118889   | NORMAL | 1.405E-09    | > | 2.197E-11    | NORMAL |
| 4  | 192.168.10.5  | 1173  | 165510   | NORMAL | 1.459E-09    | > | 2.371E-11    | NORMAL |
| 5  | 192.168.10.6  | 1074  | 154472   | NORMAL | 1.45E-09     | > | 2.326E-11    | NORMAL |
| 6  | 192.168.10.7  | 1566  | 207772   | NORMAL | 1.456E-09    | > | 2.548E-11    | NORMAL |
| 7  | 192.168.10.8  | 1105  | 155560   | NORMAL | 1.452E-09    | > | 2.336E-11    | NORMAL |
| 8  | 192.168.10.9  | 1963  | 268497   | NORMAL | 1.381E-09    | > | 2.772E-11    | NORMAL |
| 9  | 172.10.64.199 | 3386  | 1088676  | ATTACK | 3.272E-11    | < | 5.038E-11    | ATTACK |
| 10 | 172.10.85.151 | 14323   | 2432059  | ATTACK | 1.383E-24    | < | 5.793E-11    | ATTACK |
| 11 | 172.10.201.5  | 10787   | 2282970  | ATTACK | 1.023E-20    | < | 6.943E-11    | ATTACK |
| 12 | 172.10.201.19 | 7658  | 1831513  | ATTACK | 6.346E-16    | < | 7.169E-11    | ATTACK |
| 13 | 172.10.71.29  | 8899  | 2525711  | ATTACK | 1.237E-21    | < | 6.695E-11    | ATTACK |
| 14 | 172.10.71.49  | 9437  | 1433478  | ATTACK | 1.189E-14    | < | 6.856E-11    | ATTACK |

TABLE II. CLASSIFICATION WITH NEW STANDARD DEVIATION IN TIME RANGE 0-3 MINUTES

The normal class area with  $\mu$ +(3 $\delta$ ) and the attack class area with  $\mu$ +(2,5 $\delta$ ) based Fig. 13 is appropriate to cover the set members. The accuracy obtained using the formula (5) is 100%, then counted once again using the Gaussian Naive Bayes classifier to ensure the correctness of each set member. Average and new standard deviation is:

- Average of incoming IP  $(\mu)$  normal = 1338
- Standard deviation of incoming IP (3δ) normal = 3 x 847 = 2541
- Average of packet length ( $\mu$ ) normal = 186510
- Standard deviation of packet length (3δ) normal = 3 x 114045 = 342135
- Average of incoming IP ( $\mu$ ) attack = 9082
- Standard deviation of incoming (2,5δ) attack = 2,5 x 3606 = 9015
- Average of packet length ( $\mu$ ) attack = 1932401
- Standard deviation of packet length  $(2,5\delta)$  attack = 2,5 x 582331 = 1455827,5.

Table 2 shows the recalculating of Gaussian Naive Bayes classifier using a match standard deviation. The class of the normal and attack set corresponds to the access of each IP address.

The average and match standard deviation are finally used to calculate all new data of network traffic at ADUNL in timerange 3 - 60 minutes using Gaussian Naive Bayes classifier shown in Fig. 14.




Fig. 14. ADUNL Network Traffic Classification in 60 minutes.

#### V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Gaussian Naive Bayes classification can be used to process numeric attributes on a computer network service. Numeric attributes such as Incoming IP and Packet Length are the main features to know the access that occurs in a computer network. The average and standard deviation are important for processing data based on Gaussian method, which is also used to visualize in the Matlab. Traffic on a computer network service such as normal access and DDoS attacks can be

grouped according to their class. Classes using the Gaussian Naive Bayes method more specifically cover all of its members based on the average and standard deviation. This method makes it very easy to detect the flow of data packets that are characteristic of DDoS attacks. Furthermore, this paper is expected to process more attributes as well as various parameters to be able to produce DDoS attack detection with better accuracy.

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